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RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOTES-HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-GAMBLING CONSIDERATION.
-Plaintiff, a holder in due course of a check, sued the defendant as maker
thereof. The defendant pleaded that the check, having been given in pay-
ment of a gambling debt, was void under a local statute. Held: The plain-
tiff could not recover. Larschen v. Lantzes, 189 N. Y. Supp. 137 (1921).
Before the N. I. L. local statutes were enacted in many states declaring
void instruments given in payment of a gambling debt or upon usurious in-
terest Under these statutes even the holder in due course was denied recov-
ery. Unger v. Boas, 13 Pa. 6oi (185o). Then the N. I. L. was passed,
section 57 of which provided that "the holder in due course holds the instru-
ment free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from de-
fenses available to prior parties among themselves." Whether this section
served to supersede the prior local statutes insofar as the rights of the
innocent holder are concerned, has been a source of considerable conflict.
Prompted by the desire to facilitate the free circulation of negotiable
paper, and to protect the innocent pprchaser as against the maker-a party
to the illegality-some courts held that the N. I. L changed the existing law
so as to make a personal defense that which had previously been an abso-
lute defense under the local statute. Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C.
283 (igoo); KIlar v. Kostiuk, 65 Misc. Rep. i99, ii N. Y. Supp. 683 (igog).
According to the weight of authority, however, where the local statute is un-
quivocal and expressly declares such an instrument void, it is void in its
inception, and can gather no vitality, no matter what its subsequent history.
Alexander and Co. v. Hazelrigg, 123 Ky. 677, 97 S. W. 353 (Igo6); Twentieth
St Bank v. Jacobs, 74 W. Va. 525, 82 S. E. 320 (1914) ; Martin v. Hess, 23
Pa. Dist. R. I95 (1914). It is generally agreed that the holder in dug
course may recover upon an instrument which arose from such a transac-
tion as to be merely illegal, not void. Samson v. Ward, 147 Wis. 48, 132 N.
W. 629 (I91I); Farmer's Savings Bank v. Reed, 192 Mo. App. 344, i8o S. W.
ioo2 (I916).
The main purpose of the N. I. L. was to obtain uniformity in commer-
cial legislation. To accomplish this object fully the State legislatures should
have repealed inconsistent local statutes., Where, however, they have
failed to do so, it would seem necessary to apply the well-recognized rule df
law that when a certain state of facts is within the terms of both a definite
statute and a general rule of law embodied in another statute, the specific
statute will prevail. In such a case the local statutes are merely regarded
as an exception to the general rule contained in section 57 of the N. I. L.
The New York Courts, while not expressly overruling Klar v. Kostiuk,
supra, tacitly repudiated that decision in a recent case. Sabine v. Paine, 223
N. Y. 401, 119 N. F. 849 (1919). Thus it would seem that the court in the
instant case rendered a decision which is supported by the great weight of
authority and reason.
BILLS AND NOTES-PAYEE NOT A HOLDER IN DUE CouRSE.-The defend-
ant gave a note for a subscription to stock in a corporation, but made it pay-
able to the plaintiff company, which accepted it in part payment of the
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purchase of its business by the corporation. The defense was that the note
was induced by fraud on the part of the agent of the corporation. Held:
The plaintiff cannot recover, since a payee cannot be a holder in due
course. Britton Milling Company v. Williams, 184 N. W. 265 (S. D.
1921).
The general common-law rule was that a payee could be a holder in
due course. Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 (Eng. 1790) ; Johns v. Har-
rison, 2o Ind. 317 (1863). Under the Bills of Exchange Act in England,
however, a contrary rule was laid down in the case of Herdman v. Wheeler
L, R. (i9o2), I K. B. 361. But in a later case an English court allowed re-
covery by a payee on the theory that the maker was estopped from setting up
that a third party had filled up the blanks in excess of his authority. Lloyd's
Bank v. Cooke, L R. (igo7), I K. B. 794. It is believed that the latter case
has overruled Herdman v. Wheeler, supra, and that the present English law is
what it was before the adoption of the Bills of Exchange Act. 59 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 477.
The cases in America under the N. I. L. have varied somewhat, but the
tendency is to protect the payee and allow him the rights of a holder in due
course. Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, io5 N. E. 6o5 (914);
Brown v. Rowan, 9i Misc. Rep. 22o, 154 N. Y. Supp. io98 (1915); Ex parte
Goldberg & Lewis, i9i Ala. 356, 67 So. 839 (1914) ; Johnston v. Knipe, 26o
Pa. 5o4, xo5 Atl. 7o5 (i918). The leading case adopting a contrary inter-
pretation of the N. I. L. is Van der Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, i35 Iowa 350,
112 N. W. 8o7 (i9o7). The court in that case, however, based its decision
mainly on the English case of Herdman v. Wheeler, supra. For a criticism
of these two cases, see Brannan, The N. I. L, Sec. 14, C., and 59 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 477.
In the principal case, the court has followed the cases of Van der
Ploeg v. Van Zuuk and Herdman v. Wheeler, without considering the in-
terpretation given to the English Bills of Exchange Act and the N. I. L. by
the English and American courts since then. Its decision is based on
Section 52 (4) of the N. I. L., which requires a "holder in due course" to
receive an instrument by "negotiation," and interprets this clause to ex-
clude a payee.
It is submitted that this construction is not warranted. Section 30, N. I.
L., defines an instrument as being negotiated when it is transferred from
one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder
thereof. Section 19I, N. I. L., expressly defines a holder as "the payee or in-
dorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the holder thereof."
Since Section 3o abstains from prescribing that the transferor must be a
holder, it would seem that it was not intended that the N. I. L. was to
alter the common-law. Liberty Trust Company v. Tilton, supra; Brannan,
The N. I. L., Sec. 52, A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONs-UNcoNsTITUTICOA.-
ITY OF STATUTE VESTING BOARD WITH ARBITRARY PowER ro GRANT OR RE-
FUSE LICENSES TO PRACTISE DENwsTRY.-A Washington statute made it
unlawful for any person to practise dentistry unless he should file an ap-
plication with a board of examiners, for an examination, and present evi-
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dence of good moral character and a diploma from some dental college in
good standing. Plaintiff took the examination three times, but was in-
formed on each occasion that he had failed, without any record or informa-
tion as to the result of the examinations being given. Held: The statute
is void, since it is not an exercise of the police power of the state, but an
arbitrary and unwarranted interference with the constitutional right to carry
on a lawful business. Noble v. Douglas, 274 Fed. 672 (D. C. 192i).
It is well settled that a state has the right, for the protection of the public,
to prescribe such reasonable conditions upon the right to practise professions
requiring special knowlege or skill, as will exclude those who are unfitted.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. Ed. 623. (I888). A requirement
that an applicant be a graduate of a dental college is not unreasonable.
State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Dental Examiners, 31 Wash. 492, 72 Pac.
IIO (i9o3). The practice of such professions, even by persons duly admitted,
is subject to regulation in the interest of the public welfare. Bandel v.
New York, 2o4 N. Y. 683 (igiO).
But the complaint in the principal case is that this was not a legisla-
tive regulation of the practice of dentistry, but merely an attempt on the
part of the legislature to delegate to a board of examiners the right to regu-
late. In sustaining this contention, the court emphasized the failure of the
statute to lay down a rule of action for the board to follow, which would ren-
der capable of progf the question whether the board had, in a given case,
obeyed such rule. It is also pointed out that there is no regulation concern-
ing the subjects upon which the applicants are to be examined, nor are there
any tests for the determination of their fitness.
An examination of cases dealing with similar subjects shows a uniform
tendency, on the part of the various legislatures, to define more or less fully
the manner, extent and subjects of state board examinations. Dent v. West
Virginia, supra. The Pennsylvania dental examination act provides in detail
what the subjects of examination shall be and the provisions for ascertain-
ing the marks of the various applicants. Act of May 7, 1907, P. L. x61.
The decision of the court, it is submitted, is well justified, since there
is no method of determining whether or not a wrong had been done. A stat-
ute of this nature, which does not require examinations to be uniform as to
all applicants would seem to be clearly contrary to the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is not a case of an abuse of powers lawfully
conferred, but the abuse and wrong consist in undertaking to confer
unlimited and undefined powers. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 25
U. S. Sup. Ct. ig, 49 L Ed. i69 (19o4).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PRovIsIoNs OF FOURTH AMENDMENT INAPPLICABLE
To UNLAWFUL SEIZURES BY PRIVATE PERSONs.-Private papers, stolen from
the petitioner, subsequently came into -the possession of federal prosecuting
authorities who intended to use them as evidence against the petitioner in 4
federal prosecution. Petitioner sought the return of the stolen papers on
the ground that his rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated.
Held: Petition denied on the ground that the Fourth Amendment applies
solely to governmental action and not to'unlawful acts of private persons in
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which the government has no part. Burdeau v. McDowell, 41 U. S. Sup.
Ct. 574 (1921).
It has been uniformly held that the inhibitions established by the origi-
nal amendments to the Constitution operate on the National Government
alone and impose no limitation upon the powers of the states. Barron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. IX3 (887).
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, affording
security from unreasonable searches and seizures, has been adopted by
many states as a part of their own constitutions; and in construing it as
such, state cburts have held that it effects a limitation upon the power of
the state alone and has no reference to unauthorized acts of private per-
sons. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329 (Mass. 1841); Gindrat v. The
People, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. lo85 (i89i).
This view supports the purpose for which the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution was adopted. The amendment was designed
to prevent the issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance, and to
make impossible a recurrence of the persecutions that resulted therefromn
under the cloak of judicial authority; but it was not intended to afford
protection against the unlawful acts of private persons.
Although there is a recognition of the Federal Courts' jurisdicti*n over
articles improperly seized by agents of the government, and stch articles
will be returned to their owner upon petition inade before trial, U. S. v.
Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C. C. 1911); U. S. v. McHie, I94 Fed. 894 (D. C.
1912) ; such jurisdiction is exercised because the articles have been -unlaw-
fully seized by government officers. U. S. v. McHie, supra; U. S. v.
Abrams, 23o Fed. 313 (D. C. 1916).
Although once decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bacon v.
U. S., 97 Fed. 35 (1899), the question presented in the principal case has.
not before been adjudicated by the Supreme Court; but the decision rep-
resents merely a specific application of well settled principles and is fully
consistent with the earlier decisions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEIZURE UNDER SEARCH WARRANT OF PAPERS OF
EVIDENTIAL VALUE ONLY HELD A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.-,
Two contract forms, one. executed by defendant and the other unexecluted, and
a bill to defendant by an attorney for professional services, were seized by gov-
ernment officials under a properly issued search warrant. Defendant sought
the return of the papers on the ground that his rights under the Fourth
Amendment had been violated. Held: Seizure . of papers "of evidential
value only" is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and such papers
must be returned on petition since their admission in evidence would violate
the Fifth Amendment. Gouled v. U. S., 41 U. S. Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).
The United States Supreme Court, and the great majority of the state
courts, formerly recognized the principle that evidence would not be ex-
cluded because it had been obtained by seizure, even though such seizure had
been itself unlaNrful. Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585 ('9o4); Commonwealth
v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329 (Mass. 1841); Gindrat v. The People, 138 Ill. 103, 27
N. E. io85 (189i); Ann. Cas., Vol. 15, p. 1205, Note; Id., Vol. 37, P. 1182,
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Note; Greenleaf's Evidence, Vol. i, Sec. 254a; Wigmore's Evidence, Vol. 4,
Sec. 2264. The reason for this rule was that the court would consider
only the matter immediately before it, and, if the evidence were competent,
would not enter into the trial of a collateral issue to ascertain how it had
been obtained. Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302 (Eng. I8ii); Williams v.
The State, ioo Ga. 51, 28 S. E. 624 (1897). In the light of such decisions
it is not difficult to understand the recognition by a Canadian court of thi
propriety of "setting a thief to catch a thief." Rex v. Honan, 26 Ont. L. R.
484 (I912).
A variation from this strict rule was first indicated by the United States
Supreme Court when, speaking obiter, it suggested that the right protected
by the Fourth Amendment would be infringed by a seizure, whether legal
or illegal, of which the subject matter, irrespective of testimonial process,
was intended to be used in evidence, on the ground that the admission in evi-
dence of such matter, if incriminatory, would violate the right protected by
the Fifth Amendment. Boyd v. U. S., ii6 U. S. 6.16 (1885). This view, al-
though adopted by a few state courts, State v. Glamon, 73 Vt. 212, 5o Atl.
io97 (goI), has been refused recognition by the majority of them, People
v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, IO2 Pac. 517 (i909); Gindrat v. The People,
supra, and the United States Supreme Court in one instance declined to
recognize its validity. Adams v. N. Y., supra.
In 1914, however, the United States Supreme Court adopted the view
expressed by the Court in the Boyd case and reversed a decision of the
District Court for the Western District of Missouri on the ground that
letters taken from the defendant without a valid search warrant were iliad-
missible in evidence against him and should have been returned to him in
accordance with his petition filed before trial. Weeks v. U. S.,. 232 U. S.
1383 (914). This decision has since been followed by all federal courts,
U. S. v. Abrams, 23o Fed. 313 (D. C. i916); U. S. v. Friedberg, 233 Fed.
313 (D. C. 1916); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385 (I92O),
and furthermore in the principal case matter improperly seized was ordered
returned, although the petition was made during the trial, since the defendt.
ant did not know before trial that it was to be used against him.
The doctrine of the principal case represents an extension of the" prin-
ciples of previous decisions. The papers in question were held to be'in-
admissible on the ground that the public could be interested in them. "only
to the extent that they might be used as evidence."" It is submitted that
such is as valid a ground for admitting then as is that on which any other
incriminating matter, such as stolen goods, Langdon v. The People, 133 Ill.
382, 24 N. E. 874 (i89o), or lottery tickets, Commonwealth v. Dana, supra,
is admitted; and it is difficult to see how the Fourth Amendment, or the
Fifth, which has been construed as supplementing it, would be violated by
so doing.
CRIMINAL LAw-AcQuiTTAL OF MuRDER NOT A BAR TO INDICTMENT FOP
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.-The defendant was acquitted on an indict-
ment for murder. He was subsequently indicted for involuntary man-
slaughter to which he interposed a special plea of former acquittal. The
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Commonwealth demurred to this plea, and the demurrer was sustained.
Held: The judgment sustaining the demurrer was correct. Commonwealth
v. Greevy, 114 Atl. 511 (Pa. igr).
On appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the lower court
sustaining the demurrer, the defendant was discharged without day because,
inter alia, judgment should have been entered in his favor on the demurrer
to his special plea. Commonwealth v. Greevy, 75 Pa. Super. ii6 (1920).
The decision in the Superior Court was based on the theory that a general
verdict of not guilty upon the trial of an indictment for murder, negatives
the fact of the unlawful killing, and, therefore, the acquittal on that in-
dictment is a bar to an indictment for involuntary manslaughter. But as was
pointed out in the March, 192i, issue of this RviEw (69 U. of Pa. L Rev.
278), this reasoning was erroneous. In Pennsylvania there can be no con-
viction of involuntary manslaughter upon an indictment for murder. Walters
v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 135 (1862); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R.
423 (Pa. 1821). Thus, since the defendant could not have been convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, the question of whether or not he was guilty of
that offense was not in issue, and the verdict therefore, could not be a
determination of that fact.
In the principal case, the Supreme Court clearly points out the fallacy of
the Superior Court's reasoning by showing that a verdict of acquittal on an
indictment for murder is merely an acquittal of a killing "feloniously, wil-
fully and with malice aforethought," and not an acquittal of an "unlawful
killing."
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANTS AGAINST AsSIGNmENT-BREAcH By
OPERATION OF LAw.-A corporate lessee went into liquidation. The lease con-
tained a covenant against assignment without the consent of the lessor, and
provided for forfeiture in case the lessee went into liquidation either volun-
tarily or compulsorily. Held: The liquidator may assign the lease without
the consent of the lessor. It re Farrows Bank, Limited, 37 Times L. R. 672
(Eng. 1921).
The courts of both England and America have for many years looked
with disfavor upon covenants restraining the assignment of a lease. This
attitude gave rise to the well-settled rule that such restrictions, if general,
contemplate only a voluntary assignment by the lessee, and not an assign-
ment by operation of law. Doe ex dent. Goodbehere v. Bevan, 3 M. & S.
353 (Eng. 1815); Gazley v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41, 28 Sup. Ct. 687 (Igo8).
Thus an assignment under compulsion of law by the sheriff to an execution-
creditor is not within the terms of a general covenant by the lessee. Doe v.
Carter, 8 T. R. 57 (Eng. 1798); Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 21 Pac. 95!
(i889). Neither will an assignment by a trustee of an involuntary bank-
rupt work a forfeiture of the lease. Doe ex dern. Cheese v. Smith, I Marsh.
359 (Eng. 1814) ; In re Gutman, 197 Fed. 472 (D. C. 191;).
The decisions are conflicting as to whether a chancery receiver may
similarly assign without breach of the covenant. A Pennsylvania case held
that he could not do so. Spencer v. Darlington, 74 Pa. 286 (1873). The
present tendency is to regard such an act by the receiver as a transfer by
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operation of law, and hence not in violation of the covenant. Fleming v.
Fleming Hotel Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 715, 6i AtL 157 (19O5). The view of the
latter case seems correct, since the receiver, though assigning in the name
of the lessee, does so as an officer of the court and agent of the law. Thus
both authority and reason would have dictated the conclusion of the instant
case had the lease contained only a general provision against assignment.
But a further clause expressly stipulated against an assignment by op-
eration of law. A few decisions and many dicta declare such a provision en-
forceable. Roe v. Galliers, 2. T. R. 133 (Eng. 1787); In re Georgalas
Bros., 245 Fed. i9 (D. C. 1917). In some cases, however, the courts resort
to a very literal and often ingenious construction of such a prohibition to
avoid enforcing it. Gazley v. Williams, supra. So the court in the instant
case, by ignoring the stipulation in question, and treating the whole cove-
nant as a general one, was able to sustain the right of the liquidator to as-
sign. The reason for not enforcing a stipulation against assignments by
operation of law is clear. It is a rule of law that, upon the bankruptcy of a
lessee, the lease is subject to the claims of .creditors and must be dis-
posed of for their benefit. A clause contained in it which would make the
very operation of the law itself cause a forfeiture of the lease and defeat
the claims 'of the creditors, is against public policy and ought not to be
enforced. It is submitted, therefore, that the conclusion of the English
court was justified.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-CONTRACT UNDER SEAL.
-The plaintiff, as undisclosed principal, sued to obtain specific performance
of a contract under seal in which the defendant had agreed to lease certain
premises to the plaintiff's agent. The defendant demurred. Held: The de-
mfurrer was overruled. Lagumis v. Gerard, i9o N. Y. Supp. 207 1921),.
An obvious corollary to the old common law rule that none but the
parties to a sealed instrument could have any rights or be subject to any
liabilities thereunder is that a principal who is not named in a sealed in-
strument as a party cannot sue or be sued thereon. Appleton v. Binks, 5
East 148 (Eng. I8o4); Quigley v. DeHass, 82 Pa. 267 (1876); New England
Dredging Co. v. Rockport Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 21 N. E. 947 (1889);
Elliott v. Brady, 192 N. Y. 22r, 85 N. E. 69 (I9O8). This rule, still gen-
erally accepted where the common law significance of a seal has not been
destroyed by statute, is recognized and frankly departed from in the prin-
cipal case. To quote the court: "There is and can be no doubt that here-
tofore in this state the rule has been as defendant contends. But there is
no reason for continuing to follow that rule." The court further calls at-
tention to the fact that the recent decisions in New York indicate a tendency
to disregard the effect of a seal. McCreery v. Day, II9 N. Y. I, 23 N. E.
ig (iSgo); Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 4o2, 42 N. E. 13 .(i895); Harris
v. Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 13o N. E. 572 (12I).
Without questioning the practical justice of the decision or attempting to
uphold the value of the sanctity of the seal, one cannot but be reminded of
the quotation from Lord Coke to the effect that, "The knowne certaintie of
the law is the saftie of all."
RECENT CASES
TRUST FOR CHARITY-INDEFINITENESS OF OajEcT.The testatrix left real
estate in trust, the income to be used for religious and philanthropic work
in Mansfield, Ohio, especially among children and young people. Held: The
bequest was void for uncertainty. Dirlam v. Morrow, 131 N. E. 365 (Ohio,
1921).
Indefiniteness and uncertainty as to purpose do not per se render cia-ri-
table bequests invalid. On the contrary, those very qualities, to a greater or
less extent, are the chief characteristics of charitable trusts. It is only re-
quired that the general purpose be clearly stated and that there be sufficient
definiteness to enable the trust to be carried out. Bispham's Equity, Sec.
16; John v. Smith, g Fed. 827 (C. C. 1899) ; Harrington v. Pier, io5 Wis.
485, 82 N. W. 345 (1900). Consequently a gift for religious or philanthropic
purposes is usually held to be a valid charitable gift. The following exam-
ples may be mentioned: "For foreign missions," Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass.
537 (i815); "to the cause of Christ for the benefit and promotion of true
evangelical piety and religion," Going v. Remedy, 16 Pick. 1O7 (Mass. 1834);
"to the advancement of the Christian religion," Miller v. Teachout, 24 Ohio
525 (1874); "in the purchase and distribution of such religious. books as the
trustees shall deem best," Simpson v. Welcome, 72 Me. 496 (188i).; "to aid
in propagating the holy religion of Jesus Christ," Hinckley v. Thatcher, 139
Mass. 477, I N. E. 84o (885) ; "for the relief of the resident poor," Webster
v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366 (i886) ; "for the promotion of art," Almy v. Jones,
17 R. I. 265, 21 Atl. 616 (i8gi) ; "for the boys and girls of California," Ellert
v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. I29, 45 Pac. 270 (1896) ; "for distributing the Bible or
Word of God to the destitute of the earth," Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
131 Ky. 6o9, 115 S. W. 739 (igog); "for the education of poor children,"
Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 1O2 N. E. 741 (1913).
On the other hand, the following bequests were held invalid for uncer-
tainty of object: "To foreign missions and the poor saints," Bridges v.
Pleasants, 4 Ire. Eq. 26 (N. C. 1845); "for the support of indigent pious
young men preparing for the ministry in New Haven," White v. Fisk, 22
Conn. 31 (i852).
The principal case is clearly contra to the general rule and; it seems,
contra to the decisions of the same court, not only in the case of Miller v.
Teachout, supra, but in the case of Palmer v. Oiler, 131 N. E. 363 (I92I),
decided practically simultaneously with the principal case, in which a be-
quest "to be devoted to the needy and poor women" was upheld.
